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Abstract: In this paper we analyze in brief how two ancient Greek federations, the Boeotoian and the 
Achaean ones took decisions on two crucial issues that relate the balance of power between city-states- 
members within the federation and defense policy. We analyze why the Boeotoian Federation followed 
a wrong grand strategy whereas the Achaean one implemented a prudent strategy regarding the issue of 
federal principles. Lastly, we compare our findings with a series of decisions that were taken in the last 
years by the today’s European Union (EU) policy-makers, and we relate them to the issues of 
“mismanagement” of “solidarity” of economic policies among member-states and democratic decision-
making. 
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It is well-known and generally accepted that democracy, in the form of direct 
democracy, emerged in ancient Greece at the end of the 6th century BCE. Ancient 
sources mention at least 18 democratic city-states by the beginning of the 5th century 
(Robinson 2003, 2011).  
What is less well-known is that the idea and practice of federations also emerged in 
ancient Greece, already during the 5th century, notably with the Boeotian Federation 
but also with others, such as the Chalcidian (city-states of the Chalcidian peninsula in 
Macedonia), the Aetolian and the Achaean. The American Founding Fathers, Adams, 
Madison, Jefferson, etc. were very aware of this, through their readings of Polybius, 
Plutarch and Livy, as testified by the Federalist Papers (see among other on this, 
Chinard 1940; Gummere 1962; Richard 2009; Lehmann 2015). 
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The Boeotian Federation included about 31 city-states, with membership in time. 
The federation comprised the following federal institutions: At city-state level, these 
were local “parliaments”, which again comprised three to four “committees” charged 
with various administrative tasks. The federation consisted of regions which again 
included a number of city-states. Each Boeotian region was represented by a 
boeotarch who was the political and military leader of the region and represented the 
region at federal level. There were 11 boeotarchs for the eleven regions, who were 
elected by the citizens’ assemblies of the cities of each region, for one year. Abuse of 
the one-year term of office by a boeotarch was punishable by death. The meeting 
place of the boeotarchs, was the federal capital, Thebes, and its citadel, the Kadmeia 
(Bonner 1910; Larsen 1968; Buckler 1980).1 
The federation was on the whole successful, because it functioned as a counter to 
the power of neighbouring Athens during the 5th century BCE (as a major ally of 
Sparta and the Peloponnesian League) and against Sparta (and an ally of Athens) 
during the 4th. But it had a serious internal flaw. Among its constituent city-states, 
Thebes, was too powerful. There was a strong disparity of power, based mainly on 
population, and thus, on military and economic-political strength. Thus, the federation 
became de facto a Theban sovereignty, a development similar to the Delian League 
becoming an Athenian empire. 
Thebes demonstrated that she would not tolerate other city-states not following her 
lead, and would not accept defection of city-states opting to leave the federation, an 
analogy of the American Civil War. Secession was not an option for Boeotian city-
states, as it was not for the American Confederate States. Thebes destroyed Platea 
which did not want to participate in the federation since it was always a staunch ally 
of Athens, fighting with the Athenians already at Marathon, 490 BCE, and later 
Thespiai and Orchomenos, the later being the only Boeotian city strong enough to 
challenge Theban hegemony. 
In the long run this policy proved catastrophic. When Thebes revolted against the 
northern Greek kingdom of Macedonia in order to regain her full independence, she 
                                                          
1 An organization model that was revived by the Old Swiss Confederacy during the end of the 13th 
century AD and continued with the United Provinces (Dutch Republic). During the end of the 16th 
century AD and up to the end of the 18th century where the Dutch federation consisted of 7 Provinces 
including about 52 semi-independent cities. 
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was without allies, because no Boeotian city supported her, as they did not wish to fall 
again under the hegemony, preferring the more distant Macedonia. Some Boeotian 
city-states even participated actively in the war and siege of Thebes, on the side of the 
Macedonians. The result was the destruction of the city-state by Alexander the Great. 
The other Greek federations, Aetolian Achaean but also a revived Boeotian during the 
3rd century, learned their lesson and were fully democratic, preserving the equality of 
their members (Economou, Kyriazis and Metaxas 2015; Economou and Kyriazis 
2016). 
Are there lessons to be learned by the European Union from the ancient 
federations? What is the exact meaning of solidarity and its relation to the federation’s 
responsibility towards its members? The term “Union” seems to indicate an ideal, the 
goal of the EU to became a true federation which it has not achieved as yet. In fact 
some authors such as Burgess (2000) already argue that the EU has already become 
an economic confederation. 
The old, but also modern, federations were based on solidarity, trust and a 
perception of common interest. Beginning from 2000 and later, especially within the 
EMU, the EU appears in praxis to be governed by its stronger members, especially 
Germany, that impose their will and the policy mix of measures they deem 
appropriate, without taking into account sufficiently (some would say not at all) the 
interests of the smaller and economically weaker member-states, exactly as Thebes 
did. This again leads to a reaction by the citizens of these member-states (Greece, 
Cyprus, Italy, Spain, Portugal etc.), that perceive that policy measures are imposed on 
them which they have not approved in the least and which are against their own 
interests. Increasingly, the perception is of a lack of solidarity and a democratic 
deficit. This again leads in the long run to an anti-German reaction, failing cohesion 
and the danger of the EU’s breakdown. According to Riker (1964) and other scholars 
on federalism, when there is an, at least, “relative” balance of power between the 
members of a federation and the gains by participation are nor shared fairly between 
the federal members, the federation jeopardizes its future viability and existence, 
since there will not be a fair distribution of benefits among all member-states.2 Recent 
                                                          
2 In the case of the USA, a new city, Washington, was established as the capital which does not lie 
within the area of any federal state, but is a separate district (of Columbia). A further example is the 
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developments in relation to the immigration problem, the reaction of the Visegard 
Committees, the erection of walls within the EU, are indications of these trends.  
Let us illustrate through an old case how solidarity was understood by the ancient 
federations, and the lessons that we may draw. For example, we have recorded 
evidence from the historian Polybius who argues that the federal Achaean 
administration offered tax immunity for 3 years to the member-states of Dyme, Tritaia 
and Feres so as to help their economy recover after the serious damage to their 
infrastructure due to the so-called Social War of 220–217 when the Achaean 
Federation was engaged in warfare with the neighboring Aetolian Federation.3  
More particularly, during this war the Aetolian federal armed forces invaded in the 
Achaean Federation, causing major catastrophes and plundering in these city-states. 
They were among the first to be hit by the Aetolian forces because they were closer to 
Aetolia. Despite appeals to the Achaean federal authorities for help, this was never 
done because according to Polybius (4.60.4 - 5.), at that time, the Achaeans did not 
allocate the money they had to repay the troops which could repel the Aetolians. This 
possibly happened because just previously the Achaeans were engaged in a fierce war 
this Sparta under the very capable king Cleomenes III, and thus the Achaeans were 
financially exhausted. Thus, the three city-states had to hire the services of 
mercenaries to increase its own force, and pay them by its own financial means. 
However, this fact, namely the inability of the Achaean Federation to provide the 
basic federal service to its member states, being defense, forced these three-member 
states from conciliating with each other in order not to accept their annual federal tax 
obligations towards (joint contribution) and to spend the money to hire the same 
mercenaries in order to save them. Thus, the three states automatically considered that 
since the Federation failed to protect them, there was no obligation whatsoever 
against the federal government. Polybius criticized the three states for their attitude 
(4.60.6-10), believing that in this way they contributed to the weakening of the 
                                                                                                                                                                      
establishment of Brazilia as the new capital of the federation of Brazil in 1960, to replace the up-to-
then capital of Rio de Janeiro. 
3 For the political and economic organization and the historical context that lies behind these two 
federations see, among others, the recent works of Mackil (2013) and us in various papers such as 




Federation, however, as Mackil (2013: 497) points out, it is certain that in this way 
these three States wanted to demonstrate that they would not tolerate the breach of the 
public service (defense) obligations by the Federation in favor of them. 
At the end, the Federation, through its government, being elected by the assembly 
of its citizens, the supreme decision–making body, accepted that they failed to fulfill 
their obligations and responsibilities under the solidarity provision towards Dyme and 
the other two city-states-federal members. So they decided that the Federation owed a 
compensation towards the three states, which took the form of tax immunity to federal 
budget, for three years. Polybius, (History 24.2.3; 23.15.1–3.), describes very 
characteristically the doctrine that Achaean federal administration adopted:  
‘…so that the destruction of the territory of Dyme to harm the 
Achaeans [as a whole] no less than the Dymians’.   
Returning to nowadays, under the solidarity provisions of the EU, in 2010 and later 
Greece received EU and IMF loans (totaling 240 billion euro) in order to avoid 
bankruptcy and repay its debts. The loans were linked to policy measures, specified in 
the memoranda. The problem was that the policy measures were wrongly specified 
and applied, as made clear by the mistaken estimation of the (negative) multiplier. 
The real multiplier was almost double the one calculated by the IMF, leading to a 
much deeper recession than originally estimated. This mistake was recognized both 
by the IMF’s chief economist, Olivier Blanchard, and IMF director C. Lagarde, who 
publicly apologized for this. The question raised in analogy to Dyme, Tritaia and 
Feres is that, if the EU, being responsible for the damage done to one of its members, 
due to its own (and not the member’s) mistake, is liable to compensate it. 
The damage can be estimated in its order of magnitude: the difference of the 
multipliers being double, the recession for the 2010-2011 for the Greek economy was 
actually -10% of GDP, as against the wrongly estimated -5% of GDP. Taking into 
account that Greece’s GDP in 2009 was 230 billion, the difference of 5% gives an 
order of magnitude of the damage due to the wrong policy measures package, of 
about 11 to12 billion euro. Has Greece the right to claim compensation for the 
damage done to its economy due to the mistake of the EU-IMF?  
Another issue that diminishes the perception of the common interest of the citizens 
towards the EU is its substantial democratic deficit. The EU is the least democratic 
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political body among ancient and contemporary federations as measured by the 
participation of citizens in decision-making. 
While in the ancient Greek federations we have already mentioned, all institutional 
positions like the ‘general’ (who was the political and military leader), the finance 
ministers and the ‘bouleutai’ (the members who were responsible for preparing the 
agenda of the discussion in the national assemblies in the ancient federations) were 
covered by direct democratic, in modern EU, the major positions, like the President, 
the “foreign minister”, (the so-called ‘High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs and Security Policy’) the President of the EU commission etc. are appointed 
after negotiations among the governments and are not open to all EU citizens. The 
only elected body is the European Parliament, which has the smallest competences 
among the EU institutions. Is it a wonder that European citizens feel mistrustful? It is 
a clear case of ‘deciding for us without us’.4 
So, we believe once again that we can learn from the ancient federations, as the 
American Founding Fathers did. We propose that the main positions of the EU 
(President of the EU, President and members of the European Commission, etc.) 
should be open to all citizens and covered by European elections. As a second step of 
democratization, we propose the introduction of popular initiatives leading to 
obligatory referenda with a binding outcome at European level, on the model 
practiced in modern federations and countries like Switzerland, Uruguay, New 
Zealand, etc. and some US states (California), German Lander, or many European 
cities (eg., Vienna). 
Recent scholarship in economics including econometric studies indicate superior 
outcomes (measured as GDP growth) and less waste under direct democracy 
procedures than under representational ones (see among others, Blume, Miller and 
Voigt 2009; Feld, Fischer and Kirchgässner 2010; Matsusaka 2010; Blume and Voigt 
2012; Boik 2014; Economou, Kyriazis and Metaxas 2017). Thus, our proposal for 
introducing more elements of direct democracy to our modern societies seems well-
timed since there are recent facts, such as Euroscepticism and Brexit in the EU, that 
                                                          
4 We are analyzing this issue in our forthcoming book, Democracy and economy: An inseparable 
relationship since the ancient times to today, Cambridge Scholars Publications, 2019, where we 
proceed to a ranking of ancient and modern federations, according to four democratization criteria. 
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prove that the prestige of the current shape of modern liberal democracies is disputed 
by more and more citizens around the globe. 
The above two steps combined would give European citizens a feeling of 
participation in a common European future. We reject an argument being raised, that 
European citizens are immature to be entrained with such decision making. This is a 
very dangerous and deeply anti-democratic argument because the next step in this 
direction, is that citizens are not to be entrusted with the election of candidates 
because they are immature and unable to make the correct choices. So, why 
democracy at all?5 On the contrary, we believe that increased participation educates6 
citizens politically, as it did in ancient and modern democracies and federations and 
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